US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0071/00712.txt

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$Unique_ID{USH00712}
$Pretitle{74}
$Title{On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor
Chapter VI    My First Thirty Years 1898-1928}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Richardson, Adm. James O.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{navy
naval
officer
duty
years
bureau
officers
secretary
fleet
time}
$Volume{}
$Date{1973}
$Log{USS Tennessee*0071201.scf
USS Tingey*0071202.scf
USS Asheville*0071203.scf
}
Book:        On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor
Author:      Richardson, Adm. James O.
Affiliation: USN
Date:        1973

Chapter VI    My First Thirty Years 1898-1928

     Young officers may logically ask whether there is any real relationship
between the early years of an officer's career in the Navy and the attainments
or accomplishments of his mature years.

     I am one of those who think that there is such a direct and logical
relationship, and that the earlier a young officer, even as a midshipman,
gives all that he has to the full performance of his duty, the higher the
later return on his investment.

     And so I believe my formative years are a logical part of this book.

     When I left the Naval Academy, the Navy, although growing, was very small
by present standards.  There was no thought of a war, within the foreseeable
future.  No drills on board ship were held in the afternoon except fire drill
on Friday afternoon.  Among the forenoon drills were such antiquated ones as
bayonet exercise and single sticks for all deck divisions.

     General Quarters was held once a week but no regular loading and pointing
drills were held except for a short period just before annual target practice.

     The target practice had been most amateurish, with only a flag on a
barrel as a point of aim, until the Navy was awakened in 1902 by Lieutenant
William S. Sims (1880), with the ardent support of President Theodore
Roosevelt, under the slogan "It is only the shots which hit that count."

     Undoubtedly, Sims, as Gunnery Officer of the Asiatic Fleet, where the
modern target practice first started, and then as Director of Gunnery
Exercises in the Department, did much to develop improved gunnery and fire
control.  Later, he did much to develop the interest of our senior naval
officers in the Naval War College.

     In those days, and until 1916, promotion was by seniority, so that all an
officer had to do to ensure reaching Flag rank was to:

(a) enter the Naval Academy very young

(b) graduate

(c) remain reasonably sober

(d) avoid being court-martialed with possible loss of numbers

(e) pass the rather cut and dried professional examinations for promotion

(f) safeguard his health to avoid physical retirement

(g) make a record as good as average so as to avoid being plucked by the
annual "Plucking Board."

     I entered the Naval Academy on 2 September 1878.  So, I was three days
over the limiting age of nineteen years when I entered.  If an officer entered
as the oldest man in his class with many seniors younger than he, as I did,
there was absolutely no chance of his reaching Flag rank, assuming the then
current system of promotion continued in effect, and the Navy remained with a
thousand-man officer corps.

     Under these conditions, it was natural that many officers, old for their
classes, when due for shore duty, sought duty at the Naval Academy where
quarters were available for many, or rents in town were cheap, the work very
light, leisure plentiful, responsibilities almost nil, and the social life
delightful.  To a somewhat lesser degree, similar conditions prevailed at the
navy yards and naval training stations.  On isolated stations like recruiting,
inspection offices, and ammunition depots, the life was not arduous, but there
was little contact with Navy friends.

     Duty in the Navy Department was arduous and confining, and some billets
carried responsibility.  Living was expensive and recreation facilities were
available to only a few, but there was a wonderful opportunity to become known
to the officers and officials who were running the Navy.

     After promotion by selection became effective, most officers of the Navy
believed that their chances of selection for promotion were enhanced by being
known to many senior officers who might be members of the Selection Board.  In
fact, while I was Director of Officer Personnel, I had several senior captains
say to me, "Joe, I have always had duty in the sticks (obviously of their own
choice).  I shall have little chance of selection unless you can find for me a
billet in the Navy Department."

     If a young officer happened to be ordered to duty in the Department and
made a good impression, he was likely to return to the Department many times.
In my own case, in 1914, I was slated for duty as the Officer-in-Charge of
the experimental oil-burning plant in Philadelphia, when Lieutenant Commander
David F. Boyd (1897), on duty in the Bureau of Steam Engineering, persuaded
the Chief of the Bureau to accept me as his relief in order that he might be
ordered to other duty.  Thereafter, I never performed shore duty elsewhere
than in Washington, with the exception of one year at the Naval War College
and two and a half years at the Naval Academy.  In my whole career I lived
only two and a half years in government quarters.

To the Asiatic Station

     When I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1902, the Navy planned to keep
one half of our heavy fighting ships on the North Atlantic Station and one
half on the Asiatic Station.  With this distribution of ships, and
consequently of personnel, I realized that it was almost certain that I would
be ordered to the Far East within a few years.  My father was sixty-five
years old, and I wished to be reasonably near home when his final illness
came.  Consequently, I requested duty with the Asiatic Fleet so as to increase
my chance of being in home waters in the subsequent years.

     This request was granted.  I believe that thirty-nine others of the
fifty-nine members of my class also were sent to the Asiatic Station at this
time, and two others saw duty on the Asiatic Station during their first year
after graduation.

The 1902 Navy

     In early 1902, our Fleet was expanding rapidly due to warship
construction which had been initiated during the Spanish-American War and
continued after the war's successful termination.  This increased Fleet
strength and national strength was needed to provide security for the
responsibilities and interests of the United States acquired since 1898 in the
Philippine Islands, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Guam.  The rapid growth was well
portrayed by the Secretary of the Navy who, in his Annual Report to the
President, stated with pride that during the fiscal year 1902, the following
ships were accepted into the Navy:

     Battleships              Torpedo Boats
     Alabama (BB-8)           Bailey (TB-21)
     Wisconsin (BB-9)         Bagley (TB-24)
     Illinois (BB-7)          Barney (TB-25)
                              Biddle (TB-26)
                              Shubrick (TB-31)
                              Stockton (TB-32)

     On June 30, 1902, there were under construction for the Navy by contract:

8 battleships
6 armored cruisers
9 protected cruisers
4 monitors
13 torpedo boat destroyers
7 torpedo boats
7 submarine torpedo boats

     The country approves, with hardly a dissenting voice, the policy of
strengthening our power upon the sea.

     The need for the fifty-nine "passed midshipmen" that constituted my class
of 1902 was such as to cause the "Powers That Be" to graduate the class on May
2, 1902, instead of in the traditional month of June.  This step was taken
unwillingly but:

     The shortening of the course at the Naval Academy is forced upon the
Department by the urgent demand for officers on board seagoing vessels.

     An additional fifty-nine passed midshipmen represented a sizeable
increase, since on July 1, 1902, the total officer corps of the Line of the
Navy, including passed midshipmen, was only 1,023.  The number of enlisted men
was 21,433.  The Marine Corps consisted of 278 officers and 6,062 men.

     Along with a number of my classmates, I took passage in the hospital ship
Solace (AH-2), from San Francisco and arrived at Manila, Philippine Islands,
in June 1902.

     Forty-one of the fifty-nine members of my class saw duty on the Asiatic
Station during their first year after graduation.

     En route to Manila, the Solace coaled in Pearl Harbor, and visited Guam.
The Navy was then in the process of acquiring the land upon which, over the
next forty years, was to be built the magnificent Pearl Harbor Naval Base.  At
a cost of $58,140.00, 719 acres were acquired.

The Quiros

     My first duty was on an ex-Spanish ship, converted into a "fourth class"
gunboat, the USS Quiros (PG-40).  She was composite-built, steel framed,
wooden hulled, copper sheathed, displacing 350 tons, and propelled at a
maximum speed of eleven knots by a single screw.  The Quiros was powered by a
vertical, triple expansion reciprocating engine and two Scotch boilers, and
her battery consisted of six rapid-fire guns; 2 six pounders, 2 three
pounders, and 2 one pounders.  She was 137 feet from stem to stern, and had
been built in Hong Kong in 1895.

     The complement was one lieutenant, two passed midshipmen, and forty
enlisted men.  The Quiros had no electricity, no refrigeration, a single dry
compass, and a bunk for me five and one half feet long, even though I measured
six feet two inches.

     The Quiros patrolled in the Southern Philippines along the southern coast
of Mindanao and in the Moro Group of the Sulu Islands.  The latter area was
one of the more active patrol zones, as the Moros provided the last large
bandit forces in the Philippines who remained active after the organized
Philippine Insurrection, under Aguinaldo, had been crushed.

     From an operational point of view, the duty was fine for a young officer,
for there was a spirit of adventure about and things happened.  One Quiros
foray even made the Annual Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to
the Secretary of the Navy, as indicated in the following extract:


QUIROS November 20, [1902] left Zamboanga for Pandan-Pandan to investigate an
armed Moro expedition of 200 men reported proceeding to that place. [Ship's
party] . . . proceeded in an armed boat from Pandan-Pandan to Talusan and
encountered two armed bintas. . . ascended the Cabacsilan and Ciay rivers in
search of the expedition, which had dispersed.  Captured three rifles and a
supply of ammunition from one binta.


     And, the Secretary of the Navy found a place in his Annual Report to the
President to say kind things about the patrolling gunboats.


So far as conditions ashore in the Philippines are concerned, there has been a
general state of peace and the Navy has not been called upon to take part in
active operations, with the exception of the patrol of the southern coast of
Mindanao and the Sulu Islands to assist the Army in checking supplies for the
Moros and the suppression of illicit traffic of all kinds by means of boats.
The vessels engaged in the patrol work have done their work thoroughly and
their presence has been of material assistance in maintaining a state of peace
among the Moro coast tribes, such tribes having a great fear of and respect
for a gunboat.


Early Commanding Officers

     Nearly every officer, whom one serves under or with, has some effect on
one's future career.  Those officers of strong character or with marked
professional abilities, or with both, are doubly important.  The example of
the top leadership is most important.  Does this man in the leadership spot
really lead?

     So, it is necessary for me to relate who these officers were, and how
they stimulated or stultified.

     In the Quiros, during the short space of fifteen months, I served under
four Commanding Officers, the last three of whom were of the Naval Academy
class of 1887.  My first Commanding Officer, and a competent one, was
Lieutenant William Bartlett Fletcher (1881) who, at that time was forty years
old and, thru the workings of the Navy's slow promotion system of that era,
still a lieutenant.  Years later, he commanded the squadron of Armed Yachts
(Squadron Three, Patrol Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet) which operated out of
Brest, France, during World War I, as well as the Naval Base at Brest, at
which the squadron was based.  He is now - December 1956 - the oldest living
Flag Officer graduate of the Naval Academy - ninety-four years of age.

     However, Lieutenant Fletcher was soon ordered home from the Asiatic
Station, and Lieutenant Levi C. Bertolette (1887) succeeded him.  About half a
year later, Bertolette was succeeded by Lieutenant Francis Boughter (1887),
and he by Lieutenant Benton C. Decker (1887).

     The last three lieutenants firmly believed that the only way to convert a
passed midshipman into a worthwhile ensign was to give him "Hell" every minute
of the day and a fair share of each night.

     They practiced what they believed, with the result that, when I was
detached, I believed that I had the dubious distinction of having been under
suspension more than any other passed midshipman in the Navy.  I never even
requested to be excused from morning quarters during all this period. For the
younger reader, I will add that, in that hard-working period, the Navy held
morning quarters and inspection each Sunday, in addition to the other six days
of the week.

     Despite this basic policy of indoctrination, which had its successes and
failures amongst the passed midshipmen of my era, I learned a most valuable
lesson; namely, how to get along with seniors, particularly "sundowners."  I
learned not to be, or want to be, a martinet.  I learned the importance of
being able to handle sailormen, and in the international field, I learned of
the tranquilizing effect that a man-of-war can have on a disturbed political
area.  I learned to enjoy reading while aboard ship and I read much about the
countries of the Far East.

     From my reading in regard to China and the Chinese people, I learned a
few proverbs which I have quoted to my friends all the rest of my adult life,
such as:


A wise turtle keeps the pain inside.

Leprosy may be cured, but the enmity of an official underling can never be
dispelled.


     At that time (1902), the Navy had no radio, no gyro compass, no internal
combustion engines, no steam turbines, no oil-burning boilers, no range
finders, few telescopic sights, no directors, no semaphore, no damage control,
no radar, no large-scale War College attendance, no "P.G." school, no
specialization, no promotion by selection; many officers had served thirteen
years or more as ensigns.  Only two thirds of the petty officers were
native-born citizens.

     I felt that in the Quiros, I was not learning anything about the material
or the technical side of the Navy, so I requested transfer to a battleship.
This request was not granted (and many similar requests were not granted,
until over nine years after my graduation).  My Commanding Officer said to me:


Young man, there is nothing in the Navy more important than the enlisted man,
and you can learn more about how to handle him on a small ship than you can on
the larger ships in the Navy.


     As the subject of handling enlisted men is the most difficult and most
important thing for a young officer to learn, I consider that this was good
advice.  At first, the young officer is either too severe, through fear of
being too lenient, or too lenient, through fear of being too severe.
Eventually, he should learn that there is a time to be lenient and a time to
be severe, but that a man likes to serve under a taut officer who is always
fair.

     I should also add that I am now convinced that service on small ships is
best for the rounded development of a young officer.

USS New Orleans

     Although my request for transfer to a battleship was not granted, on
August 3, 1903, I was transferred as a Watch and Division Officer to the
protected cruiser New Orleans, Commander Gottfried Blocklinger (1868)
commanding, with Lieutenant Albert L. Key (1882) as Executive Officer. These
officers were later relieved by Commander Giles B. Harber (1869) and
Lieutenant Commander Hugh Rodman (1880), respectively.

     The New Orleans was a veteran of the Spanish-American War and a new ship
of 3,437 tons, 10 guns, twin screws, 7,500 horsepower, and capable of 21
knots.  Built at Newcastle-on-Tyne, England, for the Brazilian Navy and
purchased by the United States at the time of the Spanish-American War, she
had engine order telegraphs, name plates, and other markings in Portuguese,
together with the Brazilian Coat of Arms on the gangway ladder headboards and
on the wardroom silverware, including napkin rings.  She was purchased on 16
March 1898, commissioned two days later, and fitted out at the Navy Yard, New
York.  She became a member of the Flying Squadron off Santiago de Cuba, but
was absent from the Battle of Santiago because of the necessity of coaling at
Key West.

     Despite the fact she was only five years old, her 6" guns were fitted
with open rifle sights, and a single pointer at each gun had to train,
elevate, and fire the gun.

     I joined the New Orleans at Chefoo, China.  Soon after I joined this
ship, she proceeded to Tsingtao, where the Germans were building a naval base
and rebuilding parts of the port, then to Nagasaki where the ship was coaled
by coolies, largely women, and finally to Yokohama where we witnessed an
Imperial Review of Japanese troops in Tokyo and had separate gun training and
elevating gear and makeshift telescopic sights installed by a Japanese machine
shop.

     As I remember one of the very interesting occurrences of this cruise, the
New Orleans, in company with three other cruisers, Albany (CL-23), Cincinnati
(C-7), and Raleigh (C-8), and three battleships, Kentucky (BB-6), Wisconsin
(BB-9), and the famous Oregon (BB-3), were peremptorily ordered by cable to
proceed at the highest practical speed from Yokohama to Honolulu.  On this
trip, the Oregon maintained a higher speed than she did on her famous cruise
around the Horn during the Spanish-American War.  She was burning 100 tons of
coal a day and arrived in Honolulu with less than 100 tons.

     This movement of the Asiatic Fleet was mentioned by the Chief of the
Bureau of Navigation (George A. Converse) in the Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Navy to President Theodore Roosevelt:


It had been intended to rendezvous [the Asiatic Fleet] in Manila Bay for
squadron work in winter, as had been done during the previous winter, and at
Chefoo during the summer, but instead of this the Department ordered the
commander in chief to proceed, as soon as convenient, with the Battle ship and
Cruiser squadrons on a cruise to Honolulu. . . .  The readiness with which all
the instructions for this cruise were executed and the creditable performance
of the vessels themselves evoked the hearty commendation of the Department.


     However, the Secretary of the Navy did not add the political background
of the naval movement, which added great interest at the time.

     In August 1903, the Senate of the Republic of Colombia rejected the
treaty which had been negotiated with the United States, providing authority
for the United States to build a canal across the Colombian province of
Panama.  Early in November 1903, the revolution, which was to lead to the
independence of Panama from the Republic of Colombia, broke out.

     In December 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt ordered all naval ships of
combat value in the Atlantic to Culebra Island, Puerto Rico, West Indies, and
in the Eastern Pacific to Magdalena Bay, Lower California.  As described
above, he ordered the major portion of the combatant strength of the Asiatic
Fleet to Honolulu.  These movements were initiated in order to have the United
States Fleet close to Panama, should any European nation seek to bring its
naval pressure to bear to divert his planned course of events in the Panama
area.

     It was a splendid example of the dispositions and use of naval strength
which, coupled with that of a year earlier during the Germany-
Venezuela-United States controversy greatly impressed my youthful naval mind,
in regard to the uses of sea power.

     During the previous year's Germany-Venezuela dispute, it was widely
reported in our Navy that, when Germany had insisted she was going to collect
money owed by the Venezuelan Government on a bonded debt, by means of a
military occupation of Venezuela, President Roosevelt had informed the Kaiser
that he would place Admiral George Dewey in command of the Atlantic Fleet and
send it to Venezuela to prevent any landing of German forces.  This threat of
the use of the big stick was alleged to have been a major factor in obtaining
a German decision to arbitrate the dispute.

     Shortly after the return to the Philippines of the New Orleans from
Honolulu, I was ordered to the Naval Hospital, Yokohama for a short period
because of illness.

     The Japanese merchant ship, Kazumano Maru, which took me to Yokohama, was
diverted to troop-carrying duty soon afterward, as the Russian-Japanese war
broke out on February 8, 1904.  I arrived on the dock in Yokohama just in time
to witness the Russian Minister, Baron Rosen, boarding a ship to return to
Russia.

     The surprise attacks made by the Japanese, before a declaration of war,
on the detachments of the Russian Fleet in the harbors of Port Arthur and
Chemulpo, were a shock to my susceptible mind, conditioned by the code of
honor methods of warfare taught at the Naval Academy.  The remembrance of
these "foul blows" stuck in my "craw" all thru the pre-Pearl Harbor period and
showed up in some of my letters on our War Plans, as may be observed later in
this book.

USS Monadnock

     Not very long after my return to the New Orleans from the hospital, I was
transferred, in July 1904, to the double-turreted monitor USS Monadnock
(BM-3), the station ship of the Asiatic Fleet, generally moored in the
Whangpoo (Hwang Pu) River at Shanghai.  The Commanding Officer of the
Monadnock was in general charge of the gunboats operating in the Yangtze
River and its tributaries.

     The Monadnock had been originally launched March 23, 1863, at the Navy
Yard, Boston, rebuilt completely with a new iron hull at the Continental Iron
Works, Vallejo, California, and relaunched on 19 September 1883, but not
commissioned for nearly thirteen years until 20 February 1896.  She had two
horizontal, triple-expansion, reciprocating engines and a theoretical speed of
12 knots.  Her armament was four ten" breech-loading guns, two in each water
hydraulic turret mount.  The Captain of the Monadnock was Commander Dennis H.
Mahan (1869), USN, the younger brother of the very famous naval writer and
philosopher Alfred Thayer Mahan (1859).  Dennis Mahan claimed that he was a
practical naval officer, while his brother, for whose great talents he had
little or no respect, was a theoretical officer. Amongst the officers on
board, who later became Flag Officers, were Lieutenant Joseph W. Oman (1886)
and Lieutenant James J. Raby (1895).  The paymaster son of the famous
Commodore Joseph Fyffe (1853) was also a shipmate.

     I was still a midshipman when reporting to the Monadnock but was assigned
to be the turret officer of Number One Turret.  This was a detail much to my
liking, since at that time:


The task which is employing the highest energies of the Navy, and receiving
the greatest attention . . . is the work of training . . . particularly in
"gun pointing" . . .

     Commencing in 1902 under the leadership of then Lieutenant Commander W.
S. Sims and Lieutenant R. McLean, a great reform in gunnery training had been
made and carried forward with steady progress, until the accuracy and rapidity
of fire was truly remarkable as measured by former standards.


     The competition between ships in gunnery was beginning to catch hold, and
I was very fortunate that, during the gunnery year 1904-1905, the Number One
Turret in the Monadnock stood first in the turret competition of all monitors
in the Navy.  As noted by the Secretary of the Navy (Paul Morton) in his 1904
Annual Report to the President:


It is gratifying to note that an increase in efficiency [and in marksmanship]
is reported as a result of the year's [gunnery] practice, especially in the
case of the heavier guns, namely, those from 8 to 13 inches in caliber
installed in turrets.


     I received the following letter from the Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation:


     August 11, 1905.

     Sir:

     The Bureau is pleased to note that the turret which you commanded aboard
the U.S.S. Monadnock on the record target practice, 1905, attained the highest
final merit of any 10- or 12-inch turret aboard vessels of the monitor class,
thereby winning the first Navy prize for monitors' turrets.

     The Bureau therefore commends the zeal and ability displayed in the
discharge of your duties as a turret officer.

A copy of this letter has been filed with your record in the Navy Department.

Very respectfully,

G. A. Converse
Chief of Bureau

Midshipman J. O. Richardson, U.S.N.,
U.S.S. Nashville.


     To accomplish this record, many things had to be improvised in the Number
One Turret of the Monadnock.

     The Monadnock was still firing the old brown-powder ammunition and not
the new "smokeless powder."  There was no gas ejection system.

     The turret chamber and handling room were open from the deck of the
handling room to the top of the turret.

     To increase the rate at which the guns could be fired safely, we rigged
canvas bags on the guns and secured them to the front armor plate of the
turret, closed the access to the handling room with a rugged wooden door, and
to this wooden door connected the discharge of a powerful electric blower.
With the blower running at full speed, the handling room, turret chamber, and
turret were put under air pressure, so that when the breech plugs were opened,
everything except the molten brown powder was blown out of the gun.  Within my
knowledge, this was the first instance of providing a means of clearing the
bore of a gun of hot gases after firing the gun.

     In order to safely load the powder more rapidly, we rigged wet blankets
over the openings of the ammunition hoists, so that the burning grains of
powder, which frequently fell back into the turret as the breech was opened,
would not get into the ammunition hoist where the next powder charge was
exposed.

     When we reached Manila Bay and had our scheduled overhaul, the Monadnock
received new breech plugs and primer locks for the turret guns and a full
allowance of the new "smokeless powder."

USS Nashville

     Upon completion of my three years on the China Station, I was ordered
back to the United States, via the collier Zafiro, which had been purchased by
Admiral Dewey in Hong Kong just before sailing to attack the Spanish Fleet in
Manila Bay.  I proceeded then, in July 1905, to the Nashville (PG-7) as Watch
and Division Officer.  The Nashville, a small gunboat of 1,371 tons with eight
4" guns, had been built in 1894-1897 and commissioned 19 August 1897.  Placed
out of commission on 30 June 1904, she was just going back into commission at
the Navy Yard, Boston, to be assigned to the Atlantic Fleet.

     As I mentioned before, the Navy, at the time I entered it, was served by
a very large number of foreign-born enlisted men.  But, by the summer of 1905,
the nationality of the enlisted personnel had commenced to change rapidly.  As
reported by the Secretary of the Navy (Charles J. Bonaparte) in his 1905
Annual Report to the President:

     The percentage of American citizens among our seamen has steadily risen,
and it may be said that for practical purposes the corps of petty officers is
now composed exclusively of Americans.

     The Nashville spent the latter months of 1905 thru June 1906 in Santo
Domingan waters.  According to the Secretary of the Navy's report:


Owing to the exigencies of the political situation in Santo Domingo the sixth
division of the Atlantic Fleet, augmented from time to time by additional
gun-boats, has been almost constantly required in Santo Domingan waters.


     My Captain was Commander Washington I. Chambers (1876), who did so much
to promote the interests of naval aviation in its early years.  One historian
noted:


widely known as a keen-minded engineer, the captain [Washington I. Chambers]
had been concerned in most of the developments that were remaking the Navy.


     Shipmates, who were selected to be Flag Officers later, were Ensign John
Downes (1901) and Midshipman Halsey Powell (1904).  Robley D. Evans (1864) was
Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Fleet and continued on as
Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet when this Fleet was constituted on
January 1, 1906.

USS Tennessee

     When the Nashville was placed out of commission on July 23, 1906, I was
transferred to the big, fast, and brand-new armored cruiser (14,500 tons-22
knots) Tennessee (ACR-10).  "The Washington [ACR-11] and Tennessee, the finest
ships that sail the sea" were part of the old Armored Cruiser Squadron which
was commemorated in naval song and verse for thirty years.

[See USS Tennessee: USS Tennessee (ACR-10) in the Panama Canal.]

     Despite the boasts of the song, the 1908 Jane's Fighting Ships said:


The Washington Class when designed were very fine cruisers [four 10"
40-caliber guns; 5' side armor], but that was many years ago.  Since then
ideas have moved forward, and they make but a poor show besides such vessels
as the [Japanese] TSUKUBA [four 12" guns 45-caliber; 7" side armor] completed
about the same time.


     My cruise in the Tennessee was a pleasant one.  I was assigned as Watch
and Division Officer and commanded Number One Turret, at a time when it was
reported that:


The records of gun pointers for this year show that both the rapidity of fire
and the percentage of hits are greater than in any preceding year, though the
conditions governing the test of gun pointers and gun crews were more
difficult than heretofore. . . .

     This increase in efficiency is largely due to the personal initiative of
commanding, gunnery, and division officers, actuated by a spirit of loyal
competition between individual ships. . .


     Besides having a trip to France, the Tennessee was an escort for the
battleship Louisiana (BB-19), which had President Theodore Roosevelt aboard on
a voyage from Piney Point, Maryland, to Colon, Panama, and thence via Ponce,
Puerto Rico and back to Piney Point (November 9, 1906 to November 26, 1906).
My Captain was Albert G. Berry (1869), later a Flag Officer, and my shipmates
included Ashley H. Robertson (1888) and Samuel M. Robinson (1888), both headed
for advanced rank in the Navy.

USS Tingey

     On May 2, 1907, five years after graduation, I made lieutenant and was
soon (October 3, 1907) ordered in command of the twin-screw torpedo boat
Tingey (TB-34).  The Tingey had had its keel laid way back in 1899, but was
not commissioned until 1904.  She displaced, on a six-foot draft, 165 tons,
had 3 torpedo tubes and had 3,000-horsepower engines, which gave her 26 knots
speed.

[See USS Tingey: USS Tingey (TB-34) off Camden, New Jersey.]

     The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation reported in July 1907:


. . . we have not a sufficient number of officers to man properly
the ships of the fleet and vessels of the torpedo-boat type.


     Due to this officer personnel shortage, the Tingey was in the Reserve
Fleet and had no officer in her when I reported aboard.

     I recommissioned the Tingey on December 11, 1907, and stayed in her for
almost two years.  During that period, I had the distinction of commanding one
of the smallest combatant ships in our Navy and to participate in the
organization of torpedo boats into flotillas, which were organized in the
Atlantic and Pacific that year.  Further, the Tingey had the good luck to win
the Gunnery and the Engineering competitions, and was, I think, the first ship
in the Atlantic to fly the newly created Battle Efficiency Pennant.

     By the spring of 1909, I had been out of the Naval Academy almost seven
years and, under normal conditions, could expect to go to shore duty. However,
the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Rear Admiral W. H. Brownson) in his
1907 Annual Report to the Secretary of the Navy had said:


Under present conditions the younger officers of the line [lieutenants,
lieutenants (junior grade), and ensigns] can not be spared from the fleet for
assignment to duty on shore until after they have served at sea for at least
ten years.  This condition, however, results in increased efficiency of the
personnel, for it is in the fleet that an officer receives the most important
part of his training.


     Since I was soon to go into engineering work, perhaps a few official
statements on the subject may be appropriate:


At the Naval Academy all line officers are given what is probably the best
technical education furnished by any school in this country. The graduates of
such a school are naturally fit to undertake subordinate engineering duties of
all sorts.  This theoretical education is supplemented, at least during the
first five years of service, by alternate periods of duty on deck and in the
engine room. . . .  Almost every act of the line officer aboard ship has to do
with machinery and with engineering.

     This excellent general education and practical experience has not,
however, qualified officers for the important work of designing the machinery
of our vessels, and the department has met this need at an opportune time by
the establishment of a post-graduate school of engineering at Annapolis that
will, it is believed, provide fully for the needs of the service in
particular.


Postgraduate School

     In the spring of 1909, I had been put on notice that I would be ordered
ashore during the late summer.

     In early April 1909, I had received a personal letter from Captain F. W.
Bartlett (1878), USN, Head of the Department of Marine Engineering at the
Naval Academy, saying that he had asked that I be ordered to the Naval Academy
for duty in the Department of Marine Engineering.  I politely replied that I
had had no engineering assignments at sea and didn't want to teach marine
engineering at the Naval Academy.

     In order to avoid being ordered to the Naval Academy to teach a subject
which I knew little about, I submitted the following letter requesting Post
Graduate Instruction at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where our
naval constructors had been receiving their basic post-Naval Academy
instruction:


                              U.S.S. Tingey
                              Navy Yard, Pensacola, Fla.
                              April 12, 1909.

     Sir: -

1.  I respectfully request that I be detailed for the course of instruction in
     Marine Engine Design at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
     Boston, Mass.

2.  My reasons for making this request are that I am interested in engineering
     work, and I am so old for my position in the Line that there is no hope
     of my ever reaching command of a division.

     Very respectfully,
     U.S.S. Tingey


USS Delaware

     Upon completion of my postgraduate course in 1911, I was ordered to the
newly commissioned Delaware (BB-28) as Assistant Engineer Officer, and later
Senior Engineer Officer.  The Delaware was the first battleship to be built
with boilers that could use oil as well as coal and the first to have forced
lubricating for its reciprocating engines.  She was a lucky ship for me as I
had the good fortune to have among my Commanding Officers, both Captains John
Hood (1879) and Hugh Rodman (1880), and her engineering plant functioned to
the satisfaction of my Captains and the Department, as the following quotation
indicates.


To test the reliability of the reciprocating engine in its present [stage of]
development under conditions which might obtain in time of war, the DELAWARE .
. . immediately upon her return to Boston from an extended South American
cruise, was subjected to a surprise full-power run of 24 hours.  Prior to this
trial she was in port only 22 1/2 hours for the purpose of coaling, during
which time no examination or adjustment was made about her main engines.  Her
average speed for the 24 hours trial, burning coal alone, was a little better
than her contract speed.  There was no derangement of the main engines or
auxiliaries during the trial or during the Standardization runs which
followed.

     Subsequently to these trials the DELAWARE Steamed from New York to
England, remained there 12 days, and returned to Boston, having completed the
round trip without taking aboard any fuel during the trip and with 600 tons of
coal left in her bunkers at the conclusion of the trip.


     During my cruise in the Delaware, there were two Fleet Reviews.  At the
second of these reviews, on October 15, 1912, President Taft said:


A Navy is for fighting, and if its management is not efficiently directed to
that end, the people of this country have a right to complain.


     Every naval officer could say "Amen" to this ever-vital truth, and it
should be carved on the overhead of the offices of the civilian Secretaries
and their assistants.

The Changing Navy

The Navy had continued to grow and, ten years after my graduation, more than
doubled in size.  With an increase of 4,000 men during 1911, the total
enlisted Strength reached 51,500.

To illustrate the fact that shortages of technicians are a constantly
recurring difficulty in the Navy, I quote from the 1910 Annual Report of the
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Rear Admiral R. F. Nicholson):


Much difficulty has been experienced in recruiting sufficient machinists,
mates for the needs of the service.  This is due in a large measure to
industrial conditions, as there is a great demand for machinists at good wages
throughout the country.


     Despite this difficulty with obtaining technicians, the overall quality
enlisted personnel had continued to improve.  The number of foreign-born in
our Navy continued to decrease to a negligible number, and the American
character of both the petty officers and non-rated men in our was definitely
established by 1912.

     Due to the inability of the Navy to recruit technicians directly into the
Navy, in adequate numbers, the Navy Department, stimulated by demands from the
Fleet and by the social philosophy of its new Secretary, laid a firm
foundation during this period for the technical training of the officers and
enlisted personnel of the World War I ani World War II Navy. The Secretary of
the Navy, Josephus Daniels, said with enthusiasm in his 1913 Annual Report to
the President:


It is my ambition to make the Navy a great university with college extensions,
afloat and ashore.


Bureau of Steam Engineering

     On May 11, 1914, I reported into the Bureau of Steam Engineering.  R. S.
Griffin (1878) was the Chief of Bureau and Samuel S. Robison (1888) was his
assistant.  Arthur J. Hepburn (1897), later to hold the same billet as I -
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet - was also on duty in the
Bureau.  There were just twelve officers in the whole Bureau.

     In addition to my duties as Aide to the Chief, I was Personnel Officer
and Bureau representative, both in connection with fuel contracts and in
connection with Naval Petroleum Reserves.  This latter duty brought me into
contact with the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, and his assistant,
Franklin D. Roosevelt.

     The day I reported, I was informed that I would represent the Secretary
of the Navy in complying with a Resolution of Congress requiring the Secretary
of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior to investigate and report on the
feasibility, advisability, and expense of the Government owning a pipeline to
the coast from oil-producing properties in the mid-continent fields, for the
purpose of supplying fuel oil for the Navy.

     Fuel oil was expensive, and its use was expanding rapidly.  The Secretary
(Josephus Daniels) had definite ideas in regard to fuel oil for the Navy,
which he frequently set forth.  A couple of quotes from the Annual Report of
the Secretary of the Navy to the President will suffice.


I desire to recommend to Congress the immediate consideration of providing
fuel oil for the Navy at reasonable rates, and the passage of legislation that
will enable the department to refine its own oil from its own wells and thus
relieve itself of the necessity of purchasing what seems fair to become the
principal fuel of the Navy in the future, at exorbinate and ever-increasing
prices . . .

     The recent trial tests of the Nevada, the first dreadnaught equipped for
the exclusive use of oil as motive power, emphasize the growing need of a
large Supply of oil for the Navy.


     On May 19, 1914, in company with Cato Sells, who represented the
Secretary of the Interior, I left Washington to visit the mid-continent
fields.  After several months study, and based on the same information
reported by Mr. Sells and myself, the Secretary of the Interior reported to
the Congress that the project was feasible and desirable, while the Secretary
of the Navy reported that it was feasible but not desirable.

     Congress did nothing in regard to the project.

     Somewhat later, at my request, Dr. George Otis Smith, the Director of the
Geological Survey, selected an area, in the public lands, believed to contain
large oil deposits.  The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter prepared by me,
requested the President to set this area aside as a Naval Petroleum Reserve.
In 1915, it was reported that:


A step in the right direction was taken when the President, on April, 30,
1915, by Executive order, created naval petroleum reserve No. 3, containing
9,481 acres of Probable oil bearing land.


     Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 3 later became widely known as Teapot Dome.

     Mr. Daniels' interest in oil for the Navy remained at a high level
throughout his service as Secretary.  In two later reports he wrote:


. . . it is of vital importance that the Navy protect every barrel of oil
within these [Petroleum] reserves in order that at least an adequate supply
[of oil] shall be available within the continental limits of the United States
in the event of war.


     During this time, at the direction of the Secretary, I appeared many
times before the Committees on Public Lands of the House and the Senate, to
speak for him during hearings on proposed legislation that would affect the
Navy's interest in the Naval Petroleum Reserves.  It is seldom that such
opportunities come to a junior lieutenant commander, and I believe that I
greatly profited by the experience.  I learned that, to be effective, a
witness must be honest and forthright.

     I had been promoted to lieutenant commander on July 1, 1914, and in 1916
was anxious to get to sea after my two and a half years of regular shore tour.
This was particularly so in view of the war going on in Europe. However, I was
held over by the Secretary until June 1917.

     At one time, Admiral Griffin (Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering)
told me that I, a young lieutenant commander, would be appointed as his
successor.  I said that I would refuse the assignment, believing myself
unqualified.

     The Secretary was anxious for me to become an Engineering Duty Only
officer, a "new breed of cats" just created by Congress, and frequently urged
me to request such transfer from the Line of the Navy.  However, I hankered
for sea duty, not a set of quarters on shore.  We finally settled for having
me draft a list of officers who would profit the Navy, if they were to devote
all their talents to engineering work.  This list was drafted for the
signature of the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, who signed the
letter.  I then took this letter to the Secretary, who approved the
recommendations, and then to the Bureau of Navigation.  I do not remember all
the names on this short, first list of EDO's, but among them were some good
engineers, such as Joseph O. Fisher (1902), Samuel M. Robinson (1903), Ormond
L. Cox (1905), and Albert T. Church (1905).

     The Secretary was thoughtful enough to have the following letter placed
in my record:


To:  Lieutenant Commander
James O. Richardson, U.S.N.
Bureau of Steam Engineering,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

Subject:  Work in connection with the Naval Petroleum Reserves.

     Upon your detachment from duty at the Bureau of Steam Engineering the
Secretary of the Navy desires to express his appreciation of your excellent
work in connection with the Naval Petroleum Reserves.

     The fact that you undertook this work in addition to regular duties and
handled it in such a competent manner is a matter of satisfaction to the Navy
Department.

     The importance of this work and your knowledge of the questions involved
warranted your retention on shore duty after December 1, 1916 and were it not
for the fact that a continuation of shore duty at this time might adversely
affect your chances for a promotion, you would be retrained for work in
connection with pending Oil Land Legislation.

Bureau of Steam Engineering,
June 25, 191


Commander South China Patrol

     I will relate only one Personal incident during this period and I relate
it because I think it points out the great value to juniors of serving under
an understanding senior.

     Lieutenant Thomas Washington (1887) was on the staff of Admiral Robley D.
Evans (1863), Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, during my first tour of
duty on the Asiatic Station.  Later, when I was Commander South China Patrol
in 1923-24, he was Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

     I have never served under a finer officer.

     There was always something of interest happening on the Asiatic Station,
and 1923 was no exception.  According to the Secretary of the Navy's Annual
Report:


In December, 1923, Sun Yat Sen, President of the Republic of South China,
threatened to seize the customs in Canton, hitherto under international
control.  In concert with [the movement of] . . . forces of other nations the
United States sent six destroyers to Canton.  The firm stand and cooperation
shown by various naval forces compelled Sun Yat Sen to recede from his threat
to use the force and the customs continued to be administered as formerly.


     Sun Yat Sen's Proposed action was a serious threat to all of the Treaty
Powers, whose loans to China were Serviced by the revenues of the Chinese
Maritime Customs.

     During the ensuing crisis, there assembled at Canton, naval forces whose
senior officers held naval rank as follows:

British - vice admiral (Sir Arthur Leveson)

Italian - captain

Portuguese - captain

Japanese - rear admiral

USA - commander (James O. Richardson, USN)

French - rear admiral

     In the early days of this crisis, I had available to me no statement of
Policy of our State Department and no specific instructions from my
Commander-in-Chief in regard to it.  However, I believed that it would be the
best interests of the United States if my efforts were devoted to bring close
cooperation between the representatives of the Treaty Powers he firm
Protection of their mutual interests.

     Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Leveson RN, was Commander-in-Chief of the British
Eastern (China) Fleet at this time.  He was in Canton only part of time but
was close by in Hong Kong during the whole incident.

     Every evening I reported by radio to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Asiatic Fleet and the American Minister to China what had occurred during the
day and closed each despatch with - "In the absence of other instructions, I
propose to do . . . "

     Each day, I anticipated receiving a statement of policy from Washington,
I scanned the radio operators' log of the Cavite Broadcast Schedule several
times each day.  After about ten days, I found that the Asheville had copied
from the Cavite broadcast a coded despatch from the Navy Department in a code
not held by me.  The despatch was not addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, nor
was my radio call in the heading as an information addressee, but, by changing
one letter in each radio call or address, the despatch would be addressed to
the Commander-in-Chief for action and for information to myself.

     I informed the Commander-in-Chief that I believed this despatch contained
instructions for him.  Within an hour, this despatch was repeated to me by the
flagship, in a code which I held.  It read:


TO:  CINC Asiatic

INFORMATION:  Commander South China Patrol

Concentrate Necessary Forces at Canton and Prevent Sun's Seizure of Customs By
All Measures Short of War.


     On the following day, I met, as usual, with the senior naval officers of
the various nations whose ships were in the harbor and the consul generals of
the interested foreign powers.  The British Consul General, as usual, said to
me, "Well, Commodore have you received any instructions?"  I said, "Yes," and
read the despatch.  The British representative said "How do you interpret that
language?"  I said, "If Sun tries to seize Custom House here, I shall stop it
by force, but my men will not pursue his when they flee."  That reply was
satisfactory to all hands.

     After a few tense weeks, during which I, the junior force commander
present, had at my command by far the largest naval force, but having no daily
detailed instructions, the situation became normal.  No attempt to seize the
customs was made, and the assembled forces dispersed.

     At the start of this incident, the Commander-in-Chief was in the Southern
Philippines.  I was told, by what I consider an authoritative source, that he
said to his Chief of Staff, "Richardson knows more about this than I do; there
is no need for me to go to Canton and stick my neck out."

     During this incident, I had more responsibility, independence, and power
of decision than usually come to an officer of the rank of commander. I loved
it and I believe that it was conducive to my development.

     During my cruise in the Asheville I was present in the harbor of Tsingtao
when Japan relinquished the former German-leased territory of Kiaochow in
Shantung Province to China as a result of the Chinese-Japanese Shantung
Agreement (1922).  There was fear that disorder would follow the removal of
the firm Japanese control, but quiet prevailed.

[See USS Asheville: USS Asheville (PG-21), Flagship of the South China Patrol
on the Yangtze.]

     The Asheville was present in Amoy, in the Min River below Foochow, and in
Swatow during the "War of the War Lords."  I saw these cities change one or
more times and met several of the contending war lords.

     My cruise on the South China Station was capped by the Asheville winning
the Gunnery Torphy, the Engineering Trophy, and by a despatch from the
American Minister to China, reading as follows:


8615...... I Learn that Commander Richardson is Today Relinquishing Command of
South China Patrol and Desire to Record Expression My Admiration for the
Efficient Manner He has Discharged the Duties of That Difficult Post as Well
as My Thanks for his Valuable Assistance to and Helpful Cooperation with the
American Legation and Consul Officials in China Which Will be Gratefully
Remembered by All Concerned Signed Schurman 1320


     Toward the end of my Asheville cruise, I applied for duty under
instruction at the Naval War College.  I was informed by Admiral H. B. Wilson
(1881) (Superintendent of the Naval Academy) that I would be ordered to the
Naval Academy, and by C. C. Bloch (1899) that I would be ordered to the Bureau
of Ordnance, but I was actually ordered by radio to proceed to Washington by
the first available transportation.  Leave was denied me, although I had had
only nineteen days leave in the preceding nine years. When I arrived in
Washington, I learned that I had been ordered home peremptorily, for duty in
the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in connection with the Naval
Petroleum Reserves and the pending Congressional investigation.  But Bloch
interceded for me, and I went to the Bureau of Ordnance.

To BUNAV

     After my duty in the Bureau of Ordnance, at my request, I was ordered to
command Destroyer Division Thirty-Eight; slated for one year's duty in Europe,
but after about seven months, the division was ordered to Guantanamo Bay.
Arriving on 13 February 1928, we conducted one year's target practice in less
than two months.  Thence, the division proceeded to San Francisco, where I was
detached after a cruise of less than a year. Over my repeated personal
protests, I was ordered to duty in the Bureau of Navigation.  However, the
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation promised me that my next cruise would be a
long one, and his successor kept the promise.

     My prospective chief had the following official letter addressed to me -
which encouraged me to believe that my short sea cruise would not adversely
affect my future promotion:


9 March 1928

From:  Chief of Bureau of Navigation
To:  Captain J. O. Richardson, U.S. Navy, U.S.S. Whipple.
Subject:  Detail to Duty

     1. After careful consideration of the fact that you have only been at sea
on your present cruise about one year and also of the fact that your average
sea service is fifteen years compared to that of about sixteen for your
contemporaries, it has been decided to order you to duty as Director of
Officer Personnel in the Bureau of Navigation.

     2.  In issuing these orders to you the Bureau has given very careful
consideration to the fact that this limits your present cruise but feels that
the best interests of the Service will be served at the Present time by
detaching you and

     3.  The change in duty will take place shortly after the arrival of the
Division of Destroyers under your command on the West Coast.

Assigning you to the duty as above stated.

A. H. Leight


After Thirty

In 1924, the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy contained this note on
one of my former ships:


The QUIROS, an old gunboat no longer serviceable on the rivers, was placed out
of commission.

     Like the QUIROS, I was getting on in years, but instead of being placed
out of commission, my first thirty years in the Navy were ending on a note
hope for the future.